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Preface
The fundamental question of “How long will we live?” has been asked since the beginning of
recorded human history. Still today, biologists, demographers, statisticians, geneticists and economists
alike grapple with this basic inquiry of human longevity. Religion has even addressed the issue, stating in
Genesis 6:3 that people could not live longer than 120 years — “And the Lord said, ‘My spirit shall not
strive with man forever, for he is indeed flesh; yet his days shall be one hundred and twenty years.”
Amidst all hypotheses and beliefs regarding human longevity, the empirical evidence speaks for
itself: humans are living to older ages than ever before. Over the past century, global life expectancy
has increased from thirty-two years in 1900 to sixty-seven years today1. The number of centenarians,
people living over the age of 100, has doubled each decade since 1950 in industrialized countries2.
This trend does not appear to be a past phenomenon; in fact, mortality rates continue to decline
unimpeded at old ages. Regardless of the breadth of aging research, no consensus has been reached as
to the future trajectory of human life expectancy or to the limitations of human longevity. If anything,
mankind has been left with more questions than answers.
The consequences of the global ageing trend have already penetrated social, political, and economic
arenas. Socially, the family structure has been altered and there is an increased demand for geriatric
services and products. In politics, elected officials have been forced to address issues stressed by the
elderly population. From an economic standpoint, governments have readdressed public policies and
long term pension plans. Individuals, as well, have had tougher decisions to make with regard to savings
and retirement.
This paper is divided into two main parts. The first part outlines the three main scientific camps with
regard to the controversial issue of the future of human longevity. The second part of the paper focuses
on a single economic consequence of increasing longevity, namely the savings decisions of individuals.
Finally, it provides a commentary on the confluence of longevity increases and decreasing savings rates
in the United States.
Introduction
The modern era has brought with it an unprecedented rise in human longevity. After fluctuating
between twenty and thirty-five years since the Neolithic Age, human life expectancy has experienced a
dramatic increase over the past two centuries. Due to improvements in public health and welfare referred
to as the “health transition”, life expectancy stood at sixty-seven years at the turn of the 21st century.
Certain developed countries have even achieved life expectancies above eighty years, with Japan ranked
highest at eighty-two3. This striking increase in longevity has already produced a tangible demographic
change — the number of people aged 60 years or over has increased from 200 million in 1950 to 700
million in 20064.
But to what extent will this trend continue? Is the dramatic increase in life expectancy indicative
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of a long term trend or merely a past aberration? Some believe that linear extrapolations of mortality
decreases are the best method of forecasting global life expectancy. Such approaches project people to
live until 100 years or more within the close of the 21st century5. Others, however, take an even more
bullish approach—predicting that human life expectancy will increase exponentially due to the reversing
of aging in the wake of unprecedented scientific and genomic advances. Aubrey de Grey, the leader
of Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence (SENS) at Oxford, has boldly stated that through
reversing and curing the process of aging, “the first person to live to 1,000 might be 60 already”6. Many,
however, dismiss these claims as speculative science. They claim that it is illogical to assume the future
will be like the past, and even more nonsensical to project four-digit life expectancies. This contingency
of scientists refers to themselves as “realists”—positing that the upper limit to mean human longevity
is age eighty-five.
While the scientific community remains divided as to the rate of future increases in human longevity,
they agree that the prior increases and potential further improvements will profoundly affect the
economic sphere7. The extension of lifespan influences an individual’s savings-consumption decision,
investment in education, and retirement pensions. It poses serious issues to government health care
plans, such as the U.S. Social Security System and Medicare. Many speculate that the aging phenomenon
is inflationary since
a larger portion of the population is not contributing to the economy but still
8
putting more
demanding goods. Also, as the average lifespan increases, so does the standard deviation,
9
pressure on the individual to make estimations regarding their own length of life. While the economic
effects of increasing longevity are broad, this paper intends to examine savings through the lens of
increasing lifespan.
History
In order to conjecture about the future path of human life expectancy, it is necessary to understand
its past. For most of human history, life expectancy remained fairly constant. It is believed that global
life expectancy fluctuated between twenty and thirty-five years since the Neolithic Revolution, and at the
turn of the 19th century, was likely below twenty-five years10. Many women died in childbirth and nearly
half of children died before the age of ten.
However, at the turn of the 19th century, a steady rise in life expectancy began to take place in
Northwestern Europe. University of Indiana’s James C. Riley documents this dramatic change in his
book “Rising Life Expectancy: A Global History”, dubbing it the “health transition”. The preliminary
engines of longer life, according to Riley, were products of the increased standard of living brought
about by the industrial revolution, such as better nutrition standards and improvements in housing
and clothing. During the latter part of the 19th century, additional increases to life expectancy were
achieved through sanitary projects. The drivers of increased longevity in the 20th century were economic
development, public health, and biomedicine11.
By 1850, the changes that were taking place in Northwestern Europe were also occurring in Australia,
New Zealand, and Canada. By the turn of the 20th century, Japan, Eastern Europe, the United States,
and some countries of Latin America joined in. In the past half century, other developing economies,
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such as those of India and China, began their health transitions.
The numbers are staggering. Despite the dearth of life expectancy data in early history, it is believed
that global life expectancy has increased more than two-fold in the past two centuries. A study by a
Dutch Demographer named John Bongaarts examined a cohort of 16 high income countries with life
expectancy records traced back until 1850. The data showed a steady upward trend from 40-45 years of
age up to 75-8012. The only interruptions to this trend were the global influenza pandemic and the two
world wars.
High-income countries are not the only ones who have rode the longevity wave. In fact, every
continent on the globe has experienced life expectancy increases since 195013. According to a U.N.
report, life expectancy in a cohort of “least developed” countries increased from roughly 35 in 1950 to
around 53. In the same study, a broader-defined set of “lesser developed” countries experienced similar
increases from 40 years to around 6214. An interesting observation generated by the report is that the
gap in life expectancy between the first and last ranked country decreased from 31 years to 25 years
over the past half century. However, on a broader level, studies have concluded that there is no overall
convergence trend between low and high life expectancy countries.
In light of this finding, it is prudent to examine the leaders rather than the laggards when examining
the future course of life expectancy. In other words, one can assume that a country such as Belize,
with a slightly above average life expectancy, will eventually achieve the gains that the leading countries
have already experienced. In assessing the future of global life expectancy, we draw our focus to the
countries that have achieved remarkable advances in life expectancy, such as Japan, the United States,
and the countries of Western Europe. The gains in life expectancy that these leading countries have
garnered from advancements in economic development and public health will likely soon be realized
by the less advantaged countries. This train of thought rests on the notion that all people of the world,
regardless of ethnicity or gender, are endowed with an equal quantity of health capital. Therefore, if
Singaporean women achieve a life expectancy of 90 years, then we can logically deduce it is possible, at
a point in time, for global life expectancy to achieve that mark. The worldwide cohort with the highest
life expectancy is deemed the “best practice life expectancy”—a metric commonplace in demographic
analysis and a centerpiece in many studies regarding future life expectancy.
Three Schools of Thought on the Future of Global Life Expectancy
Projecting the future course of human longevity is no easy task. Economists, biologists, politicians,
doctors, statisticians, and demographers have produced a magnitude of literature trying to answer the
straightforward questions of: How long will humans live in the year 2100? What about the year 2300?
Is there a maximum human life span? The answers to these questions have produced anything but
a consensus. In fact, academics within the same discipline have come up with completely different
answers.
To simplify things, the prevailing views of future human longevity can essentially be placed into
three schools of thought: the realists, the optimists, and the futurists.
The Realist Camp: A Peak at 85
In a 1980 article in the New England Journal of Medicine, James Fries made the bold prediction that
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human life expectancy had a natural limit at 85 years with a standard deviation of 7 years15. The Fries’
Hypothesis, as it came to be known, is the fulcrum of what is now known as the Realist camp. Realists
believe that, in the absence of medical interventions, average human life expectancy is unlikely to exceed
85 years. This theory is rooted in both biological and statistical underpinnings.
The origin of Fries work can be traced back to Aristotle. The Aristotelian view on human life span
was incredibly simplistic, yet it was widely accepted for over two millennia and still has a following today.
Aristotle believed that there were two forms of death—premature and senescent. Premature death was
the equivalent of extinguishing a fire with a bucket of water; senescent death consisted of burning all
the wood until it extinguished on its own. Aristotle maintained that each individual was born with a fixed
amount of “fuel” or wood, and therefore had a finite limit to their lifespan.
Today, Dr. Carnes and Olshansky, two prominent realist colleagues, have produced copious amounts
of literature to support the realist camp. As students of medicine, they take a scientific angle to aging—
contending that a longevity gene is not naturally selected for because it falls beyond the reproductive
ages16. As a result, harmful genes are able to operate at old ages without any Darwinian opposition17. In
other words, realists believe that investing physiological capital into the body beyond the reproductive
years and those years needed to nurture offspring is an unnecessary outlay18. According to this view,
the longevity increases seen over the past century do not have evolutionary sources, but are due to
exogenous causes such as improvements in public medicine. Likewise, any further increases in life
expectancy beyond the age of 85 must be a result of further decreases in infant mortality and other
premature deaths. Realists rest on the notion that past improvements in life expectancy were shocks,
rather than engines, and are unrepeatable by nature. For instance, the reduction in mortality due to the
creation of the polio vaccine was a one-time shock, rather than a continuous source of improvement.
Nevertheless, the Realists acknowledge that the modification of the human genome by artificial
means or reversing the process of aging could provide a way to extend life expectancy beyond 85. They
also recognize that advances in nanotechnology and other sciences could provide a breakthrough in
longevity. However, given mankind’s current ability and willingness to manipulate senescent genes, life
expectancy’s peak will not exceed 85 years.
Why the number 85? The study conducted by Olshanky and Carnes demonstrated that in order
to reach this target life expectancy, death rates would have to be reduced by 55% from 1985 levels—a
reduction equivalent to the elimination of cancer and heart disease. Furthermore, this study concluded
that, with infant mortality constant at 5%, the elimination of all deaths before the age of 85 would
be required in order for humans to achieve a life expectancy of 100 years. In other words, no deaths
under the age of 85 could occur due to car accidents, homicides, cancer, obesity, HIV/AIDS, and other
prominent mortality causes in order for humans to live to an average age of 10019.
In addition to contemplating a maximum average human life span, realists also take a stance on the
limit to human life. Olshanky and Carnes liken human longevity limits to world record times for the
one-mile run. Times that were beat by several seconds in the past are now surpassed by only fractions of
a second. They claim that “a naïve extrapolation model…leads to the prediction that eventually the race
will be completed the very moment the starting gun fires”20. In other words, realists claim that there are
practical constraints on how long humans can live. In their words, “while bodies are not designed to fail,
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neither are they designed for extended operation”21. Because bodies are not built for extended
operation, life span is finite and subject to a warranty.
The Optimists’ Take: 100 and Beyond
The optimist camp consists of those who believe that life expectancy will exceed the realist’s peak
at 85 years but will not experience an exponential rise, as the futurists claim. Optimists claim that life
expectancy will continue to improve past the age of 85, and perhaps into the early or mid 100’s towards
the end of the century. This view is based on statistical approaches and sociological explanations.
One of the most prominent longevity optimists is demographer James Vaupel. He argues that a limit
to human life expectancy either does not exist or is out of the realm of current conceivability based on
past empirical data. He points out that many published historical estimates of life expectancy limits have
been surpassed. In 1928, the statistician of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Louis Dublin,
predicted a limit of 64.75 years to human life expectancy. Unbeknownst to him, this barrier had already
been broken by non-Maori New Zealand women. More recently, Olshanky’s 1990 prediction of a life
expectancy limit of 35 years at 50 years of age was broken six years later by Japanese females22. These are
two of many instances of experts publishing life expectancy limits that later turn out to be broken. In
fact, the U.N. Population Council has continuously made upward revisions to life expectancy limits from
the 1950’s through 1980, at which point they abandoned the practice of imposing limits23. Furthermore,
the US National Research Council recently concluded that any limits to life expectancy are too far above
the current level to impose ceilings in future projections.
In addition to scrutinizing past predictions, Vaupel’s argument also draws upon linear extrapolations
of historic life expectancy data. He uses a metric deemed “best-practice life expectancy”— a measure
of the highest gender and country-defined cohort globally. For instance, in 2007, the best-practice life
expectancy cohort was Andorran females at 86.62 years. Vaupel notices an astonishingly linear trend in
best-practice life expectancy. The data shows that best-practice life expectancy has risen steadily for the
past 160 years at a pace of approximately 3 months per year (r²=.992). In 1840, Swedish women were
the longest-living cohort at 45 years; in 2002, Japanese women were living to a global high of 85. The
regression line shows a slope of .243, namely an increase of a quarter-year per year, or two and a half
years per decade. The best-practice life expectancy line happens to be equivalent to the record-holding
24
female life expectancy country line due to the gap between female and male life expectancies. However,
it is noteworthy that record life expectancy for men has also risen linearly, albeit at a slightly slower rate
of .222 years per year.
The value of these findings is incredibly significant. According to Vaupel, it suggests that “reductions
in mortality should not be seen as a disconnected sequence of unrepeatable revolutions but rather as
a regular stream of continuous progress”25. This finding runs precisely counter to the realist claim.
Moreover, the gap between a cohort’s life expectancy and best-practice life expectancy provides “a
measure of how much better a country might do at current states of knowledge and demonstrated
practice”26. As mentioned earlier, there is no reason to assume that any nationality or gender is innately
endowed with more health capital than another. As a result, the laggards should be able to experience
the mortality decreases that come along with improvements in income, nutrition, education, medicine
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and the like. Extrapolations of the data produce a scenario in which record life expectancy would reach
100 years in six decades.
The realist and optimist camps often engage in dialogue on specific issues within the longevity
debate. For instance, the realists claim that gains in global life expectancy have leveled off in recent
decades relative to the first half of the 20th century. Wilmoth and other optimists acknowledge that
life expectancy has leveled off in the past century, but that death rates have, in fact, declined at an
accelerating rate. In other words, as Wilmoth points out, it is possible for life expectancy to increase at
a decelerating rate, while decreases in mortality remain constant or even accelerate. Life expectancy is,
by definition, “the average age at death for any group of individuals whose lifetime mortality experience
mirrors that of the period in question”27. As a result, the decline in infant mortality at the beginning
of the century had a greater impact on life expectancy than the decrease in old-age mortality is having
today. This is for the simple reason that saving an infant, who may have lived to seventy-five, produces
far greater gains in life expectancy than an elderly member surviving to eighty instead of seventy-five.
In other words, diminishing gains in life expectancy doesn’t mean that longevity increases are coming
to a halt.
Vaupel and other scholars in the optimist camp point to the fact that age-specific death rates at the
oldest ages have exhibited steady declines and show no signs of leveling off. This trend is undetectable
in life expectancy data, but it has become apparent through several studies examining death rates of
the elderly. These claims run counter to several primary realist tenets. One centerpiece of the realist
camp is the Gompertz curve, which describes an exponential increase in death rates with age. However,
recent studies have invalidated the Gompertz curve due to the dramatic increases in survival of the
elderly. Another long standing realist claim made by Fries (1980) suggested that: “the number of very
old persons will not increase”. In spite of this, Kannisto looked at demographic data from 27 developed
countries and discovered that the number of centenarians has roughly doubled every decade since 1950.
Further, the population above age 80 has more than tripled in the forty years following 1950, growth
disproportionate to that of the overall population.
Numerical analysis shows that average death rates in these 27 countries at ages above 80 have
declined at a rate of 1 to 2 percent a year for females, and .5 to 1.5 percent for males since 1960.
Kannisto points out that “if mortality among the oldest-old were approaching biological or practical
limits, then countries that have the lowest death rates would be closer than other countries to
such limits”28 . However, rates of mortality improvement show only a weak correlation to levels of
mortality. Since half of all female and a third of all male deaths in developed countries occur after
the age of 80, a reduction in mortality at older ages is crucial in determining the future trajectory of
life expectancy29. Another Vaupel study has shown that, at very old-ages, human mortality decelerates.
According to a study of 287 million people, death rates seemed to follow a quadratic trajectory30.
After age 80, death rates increase at a decelerating rate until the age 110 at which point their decline
is accelerated.
Due to decreased old age mortality, the number of centenarians is growing rapidly. A study by
Vaupel and one of his colleagues indicated that the number of centenarians has doubled globally each
decade since 1950, and grew at a staggering 7% annual rate between 1950 and 198031. According to the
Census Bureau, centenarians constitute the fastest growing segment of the U.S. population. Also, it is
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predicted that the chances of becoming a centenarian for those born in the baby boomer generation
between 1946 and 1964 is one in 26, an estimated increased from 1 in 20 million at the beginning of
the 19th century32.
Optimist scholars argue that if life expectancy in developed countries was approaching a maximum,
then the pace of improvement in developed countries should be lower than that of lesser-developed
countries. However, this is not the case. According to Riley, the gap between a cohort of “high life
expectancy countries” and “lowest life expectancy countries” has remained virtually constant since 1900,
barely increasing from 24.6 to 26.3 years33. Most statistical studies examining this trend cannot find any
evidence of a convergence in life expectancies worldwide.
In sharp contrast from the statistical approaches of Vaupel, Wilmoth, Kannisto, and other optimists,
Nobel Laureate Robert Fogel attempts to explain the dramatic rise in human longevity through his
Theory of Technophysio Evolution. He attributes past mortality declines to the unprecedented level
of control that humans have over their environment. Over the past 300 years, humans have been able
to “increase [their] average body size by over 50 percent, to increase [their] average longevity by more
than 100 percent, and to greatly improve the robustness and capacity of vital organ systems”34. Fogel
attributes this increase to the synergies between technological and physiological improvement. Human
physiological capital, he claims, is not fixed—in fact, it’s mutable. He argues that health capital will
continue to increase as humans gain further control over their environment.
Optimists also have a biological response to the realist claim that human longevity is not an
evolutionarily stable strategy. Judge and Carey claim that grandparents providing monetary support
across generations can help improve the survival prospects of their kin. They state: “Increased per
capita investment in offspring decreases juvenile mortality, increases the health and well-being of
offspring, and thus improves adult health and survival.”35 In other words, if intergenerational transfers
from older to younger generations decrease mortality, the result is a natural selection for longevity.
Transfers of resources, knowledge, and skills also flow from younger to older generations. For example,
elderly moving back with their children has been a popular trend over the past couple decades. Overall,
Judge and Carey suggest that a symbiotic relationship between generations may increase the survival
prospects of all parties involved.
Up to this point, the studies discussed have taken a holistic approach to examining life expectancy.
John Bongaarts, in his paper “How Long Will We Live?” seeks to decompose past trends in increasing
life expectancy. He separates all causes of death into three categories: juvenile mortality, background
mortality, and senescent mortality. Juvenile mortality, denoted as “J”, includes all those causes of
death under the age of 25. Background mortality, denoted as “B”, includes all those causes of death
that are independent of age (i.e. accidents, infectious diseases, etc.). Senescent mortality includes all
the other causes of death that come along with the deterioration of biological processes at old ages
(i.e. heart disease, cancer, etc.).
Bongaarts aims to isolate LE (life expectancy), LEj (life expectancy assuming no deaths before age
25), and LEs (life expectancy in which senescent mortality is the only cause of death). The effect of
juvenile mortality (J) on life expectancy can be calculated as the difference between LEj and LE. Likewise,
the effect of background mortality (B) can be derived by subtracting LEj from LEs. The resultant
equation allows us to estimate LEs, life expectancy without any juvenile or background mortality.
32

The Future of Human Life Expectancy: Have We Reached the Ceiling or is the Sky the Limit?, The National Institute on Aging.
Washington D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, (2006), 2.
33
James C. Riley, “Estimates of Regional and Global Life Expectancy, 1800-2001,” Population and Development Review, 31 (2005), 541.
34
Robert W. Fogel, “Changes in the Process of Aging During the Twentieth Century: Findings and Procedures of the Early Indicators
Project,” National Bureau of Economic Research, (2003), 24.
35
James R. Carey and Debra S. Judge, “Life Span Extension in Humans is Self-Reinforcing: a General Theory of Longevity,” Population
and Development Review, 27 (2001), 417.

Spring 2009 | SPICE | The Philosophy, Politics and Economics Undergraduate Journal

27

J = LEj – LE
B= LEs – LEj
LE= LEs – B – J
Through further algebraic manipulation, Bongaarts concludes that the change in life expectancy
at birth is equal to the rise in senescent life expectancy, plus any decrease in background mortality or
juvenile mortality.
∆LE = ∆LEs + ∆B + ∆J
Bongaarts applies this statistical decomposition to five developed countries that have relatively upto-date records of causes of death since 1850—Denmark, England and Wales, Norway, Sweden, and
the Netherlands. This exercise reveals some significant findings. Data from both males and females
exhibited similar trends, and for purposes of this summary, only female data will be analyzed. Life
expectancy over this 150 year stretch increased from 45.7 years to 80.7 years. Life expectancy without
juvenile mortality, LEj, over this same stretch increased from 63.9 years to 81.4 years, and senescent
life expectancy, LEs, increased from 72.3 years to 81.7 years. In other words, senescent life expectancy,
LEs, was already significantly high in 1850—26.6 years higher than normal life expectancy in that year.
However, due to large reductions in juvenile mortality (J) and background mortality (B), senescent life
expectancy (LEs) is now only 1 year higher than normal life expectancy.
In other words, most of the improvements in life expectancy prior to 1950 were reaped because
of decreases in juvenile and background mortality. However, after 1950, the rise of life expectancy was
primarily caused by a rise in senescent life expectancy. As Bongaarts points out, an increase in public
medicine helped senescent life expectancy advance—“medical treatment became more effective around
the middle of the twentieth century with the widespread use of antibiotics and the ability to treat
cardiovascular and other chronic diseases.”36
After accounting for the effect of smoking in senescent life expectancy, Bongaarts makes several
assumptions to project a future course for human life expectancy. He assumes that there will be no
further decreases in juvenile or background mortality, and that all future gains in life expectancy will
come from advances in senescent life expectancy. He also assumes that smoking levels stay constant.
Further, he supposes that over the next fifty years, senescent
life expectancy will increase at the same rate
37
it did from 1950 to 2000 in 16 developed countries.
Over this stretch, senescent life expectancy increased on average .15 years per year or 7.5 years
for the half century period. This projection rate is applied to a series of countries; for instance, life
expectancy in the United States is projected to rise to 87.0 years in 2050. This linear trend in senescent
life expectancy portrays strong evidence towards the optimist stance that there is no looming limit to
human longevity. While this projection is slower than the .25 years per year estimated by Oeppen and
Vaupel (2002), it is still significantly faster than the U.S. Social Security estimates of .11 years per year.
Vaupel summarizes the optimist camp’s views well in saying: “Given the extraordinary rise in bestpractice life expectancy and the demonstrated near-sightedness of expert vision, the central forecast
should be based on the long-term trend of sustained progress in reducing mortality.”
The Futurists’ Take: Immortality?
The futurist approach to human longevity is undoubtedly the most controversial of the three views.
Rather than being founded on history, the futurist approach to life expectancy focuses on the projected
progress of science. Futurists make a bold prediction—namely that we are on the brink of a scientific
revolution in which humans born in the 21st century, and maybe even the 20th century, will experience
an exponential increase to four-digit life expectancy. While this may seem farfetched, there is a large
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contingency of scientists who believe that these advances are not only possible, but inevitable. In fact,
a recent survey of 60 demographers, gerontologists, and aging researchers asked to estimate the life
expectancy of a baby born in the year 2100 responded with a mean estimate of 292 years, with 9
members responding with figures above 200 years.38
Futurists reject an extrapolation approach to estimating future life expectancy, as used by the
optimists. Prominent futurist Aubrey De Grey uses an analogy of human progress to undermine the
optimist’s statistical approach to projecting future longevity—“In 1900, extrapolation of trends in the
speed of ocean-going liners over the previous century or two would have predicted that the time taken
to travel from London to Washington D.C. in 2004 would be at least a couple of weeks.”39 De Grey urges
disbelievers to think of the human body as a machine, like a car, composed of a large number of parts
working together. As we age, parts of our body may lose function—just as when a car gets older, its
brakes may lose effectiveness or its overhead light may burn out. However, with the proper technology,
any organ in the human body can be fixed or even replicated—similar to the way a technician installs
a new break pad or rewires the lights in an automobile. If one agrees that an automobile can achieve
immortality through temporary maintenance and replacement of its parts, it follows logically that a
human body may do the same given the proper technology. De Grey points to buildings in Venice that
have continued to exist over thousands of years due to periodic maintenance. Granted the human body
is significantly more complex than an automobile or building—it still contains a finite number of parts
whose malfunctions can be corrected by a finite amount of technology.40
This idea of constantly re-engineering our bodies calls for a paradigm shift in the way science views
aging. Rather than being an inevitable breakdown of our system, the futurists claim that aging is a
disease that can be prevented or even reversed.41 By leveraging our understanding of nanotechnology,
stem cell science, and the human genome, scientists will soon be able to overcome the aging process in
the post-reproductive years. Nanotechnology could efficiently repair physical damage, Stem Cell Science
could provide rejuvenation to our vital organs, and increasing knowledge of the Human Genome could
allow us to identify and manipulate the genes that control longevity.42 Futurists points to seven causes
of aging from cell atrophy to mitochondrial mutations—addressing potential cures and progress made
in each category.43
Many point to a hypothetical event known as Singularity as the launching point of an exponential
increase in human longevity. Singularity refers to a period of extremely swift technological progress
coupled with the advent of self-improving intelligence. It refers to the creation of artificial intelligence
with greater capabilities than human intelligence. Begin with the idea that technology is the product
of human intelligence. As a result, all technology is the result of human intelligence. However, if
technology can, in turn, produce intelligence greater than the initial human intelligence, then the loop is
closed—creating a positive feedback effect and a self-propelling cycle. The result is technology with the
ability to self-improve and subsequently create new technology unforeseeable by mankind.44
Artificial intelligence offers faster and smarter intelligence than that of humans. Computer chips fire
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at speeds ten million times faster than the 150 neurons per second rate of humans. Given the acceleration
of speeds as witnessed by Moore’s Law, a one-million fold increase is probable within the next couple
decades. This kind of speed would produce the amount of thinking that normally takes place in a year
to occur in 31 seconds. Better yet, the entire volume of human thought from Socrates to today would
occur in a mere 22 hours.45 Faster-than-human intelligence is one thing, but the core of singularity
focuses on the creation of smarter-than-human intelligence. One mind, even slightly smarter than
that of humans, could in turn create smarter minds. Considering the fact that all human technological
advances have come from the threefold increase in human brain size over chimpanzees, the promise of
self-improving technology is awe-inspiring. The creation of smarter-than-human intelligence could be
“the first domino in a chain, [or] starting an avalanche with a pebble.”46
This acceleration of technological advances describes a phase in which humans would possess an
encyclopedic knowledge of the human body, cures to virtually every intrinsic cause of death, and the
technology to create synthetic organs and effectively conduct large-scale surgeries. It is as hard for
modern day scientists to conceive of a post singularity universe as it was for Benjamin Franklin to
imagine all the uses of electricity and all the inventions that came about as a result of it.47 At the very
least, however, humans could expect an increased life span, perhaps immortality.
An important distinction to be made in the debate over increasing longevity is “quantity” versus
“quality” of the added years. Are additional years of frailty and decay tacked onto the end of old age?
Or is our life stretched proportionally so we may enjoy more of each phase? Futurists opt for a third
scenario in which technology would allow humans to stay biologically equivalent to a twenty-five year
old for eternity. A life expectancy of one thousand would result from an indefinite possession of a
mortality rate seen in young teenagers in wealthy societies today.48
Part II: Longevity and Economic Savings
Determining which theory of human longevity will ultimately come to fruition is incredibly
complicated, as the issue spans many disciplines and involves a multitude of variables. All three camps
are supported by prestigious and intelligent personnel, and all three make a convincing argument.
Perhaps humans will look back several centuries from now and remark at the transparency of the
correct prediction, while scoff at the theories that were proven wrong. The concept of a “round world”
several centuries ago was perhaps more unconventional than “four-digit life expectancies”. Furthermore,
one cannot neglect the possibility that none of the three theories is accurate in portraying human life
expectancy. For instance, an incurable infectious disease, global warming, or nuclear conflict could
reverse the trajectory of human life expectancy. Instead of weighing the veracity of each longevity
theory and taking a clairvoyant approach, this paper will shift its tactic. It will assume that life expectancy
will increase into the future and examine how it influences the human decision to save.
Imagining a world where humans live to 150, 200, or even 1000, is mind-boggling. Imagine staying
in school until you’re forty, graduating with an M.B.A., J.D., and PhD in Anthropology. Perhaps then you
would spend thirty years as a lawyer, twenty as a businessman, and then set off to the third-world for
a fifteen year sabbatical. Nine children and eighty years later, your first marriage ends. You go back to
school for another ten years to get that M.D. You then work in medicine for fifty years before remarrying
and settling into a forty-year retirement. Is this what a typical two-hundred year life would look like?
Maybe, maybe not. Speculation is interesting in theory, but impossible to truly test. Instead of taking
a holistic approach to how increased longevity will affect human life, this paper aims to approach the
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consequences from an economic perspective.
Rising longevity has a host of macro and microeconomic consequences. Economists have teamed
up with demographers and scientists to devise models to capture this ageing phenomenon. The studies
have examined the impact of improvements in life expectancy on the fertility rate, schooling time, GDP
growth, and retirement age, among many other variables. Methodologies include the construction of
simple theoretical models, the regression analysis of macroeconomic data, and qualitative approaches to
the subject. The broadest and most universal of the variables studied is savings—both on an aggregate
level and the rates themselves. The remainder of this paper seeks to examine and understand the effects
of increasing longevity on savings. The following section will review several of the current models
reconciling life expectancy and savings, and the final section will look at how increased longevity has
affected savings in the United States.
The most universal model of an individual’s intertemporal saving and consumption was proposed
by Albert Ando, Franco Modigliani, and Thomas Friedman in the 1950’s. It is known as the Life-Cycle
Model. The thrust of this model is utility smoothing—the notion that individual’s consume a constant
annuity of their lifetime income over each period of their life. In other words, individuals borrow against
expected future income in childhood, save during their working years, and then consume the remainder
of their wealth in retirement. In the absence of bequest motives or intergenerational transfers, the
saving of the working aged population should perfectly offset the negative savings of children and
elderly—assuming a uniform age distribution and no population growth.49
If life expectancy increases and retirement age stays constant, the Life-Cycle model predicts greater
average savings rates as individuals increase accumulation of assets for their retirement. Consumption
would decrease during working years, as individuals substitute labor for leisure in order to save more
for later years. Furthermore, due to compounding returns, there is a greater incentive to save at younger
ages with a longer time horizon.
Jonathan Skinner illustrates this increase in savings rates as a result of rising longevity. Assuming
you enter the workforce without any positive or negative savings, you need to save 1 – (working years/
(working years + retirement years)) each year in order to smooth consumption over an expected life
span. For example, if you are a 25 year old entering the work force, planning to retire at 65 and live until
74, you need to save 1-(40/49) or 18% of income per year in order to finance your retirement. Now let’s
assume life expectancy increases two years from 74 to 76. Keeping working years constant, the resulting
savings rate is 1 – (40/51) or 21%.50
If this simple model is accurate, rising longevity should result in an increase in savings rates at all
ages. However, empirical evidence supports the opposite behavior. The past half century has seen
decreasing savings rates coupled with rising life expectancies in many regions of the world. Skinner
attributes this enigma to the “bequest motive”—the anticipation of intergenerational transfers from
deceased family members.
Regardless, this simple model fails to take into account the exact nature of the longevity increase.
The model assumed that the extra two years of life were tacked on at the end of retirement, a far
cry from the actual reality of increasing life expectancies. Is a proportional rescaling of the life cycle
more appropriate? In other words, if life span doubles, then each period of life doubles — resulting
in one’s childhood, working years, and retirement to all become twice as long. Under this proportional
restructuring, Lee and Goldstein suggest that savings rates would be unaffected. As humans live longer,
they spend more time in school, reproduce later, work longer, and retire later. Because working years
and retirement years grow by the same proportion, savings rates can stay constant according to the Life49
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Cycle model.51 Assume life expectancy doubles. Under proportional rescaling, working years double,
lifetime earnings double, and savings for retirement doubles—funding a retirement that is twice as
long. In other words, a longer life span doesn’t necessarily need to affect savings rates if working
lifetime extends proportionally.
Lee and Goldstein also discuss the difference between weak proportionality and strong
proportionality. The former adjusts to increases in life expectancy by shifting the mean age of each
phase proportionally, while holding the variance of each phase constant. The latter shifts both the
mean and variance proportionally. Assuming a weak proportional increase, a doubling of life expectancy
would facilitate the start of puberty at 26 years of age, instead of the normal 13. However, if puberty
typically lasts 5 years (from age 13 to 18), then after the weak proportional increase it would still last 5
years and take place from 26 to 31. Strong proportionality, on the other hand, calls for an increase in
both age and variance—resulting in a 10 year long adolescence from 26 to 36 years.
Empirical evidence, however, indicates that life span does not increase proportionally, in either a weak
or strong manner. Lee and Goldstein examined the major transition points of life such as completion
of college, first marriage, and birth of first child in Japan, Sweden, and the United States. They found
that these transition points were increasing at a rate faster than that of life expectancy. Among American
females, for instance, age of first birth was increasing at 4 times the rate of life expectancy and age
of marriage was increasing at 9 times the rate. They also discover the trend of increasing educational
enrollment at every age, including younger ages. Extending education into adulthood supports
proportionality, but increased enrollment in preschool and day care is contradictory to the notion of a
stretched lifespan. In other words, the prescribed behavior for parents under proportionality would be
to wait longer before enrolling their children in school.52 Other social evidence, however, supports the
notion that the time it takes to reach adulthood is decreasing — demonstrated by younger voting ages
worldwide, adult criminal penalties for minors, and the biological trend of reaching physical maturity at
younger ages.53
Proportionality does not seem empirically evident at the later stages of life either. If proportionality
held true, one would witness later retirement ages due to the extension of the working years. Kotlikoff
makes two proposals about shifting retirement ages. First, he suggests that retirement age may rise
proportionally to an increase in longevity. Second, he suggests that individuals may treat the number
of retirement years as constant at the end of one’s lifetime.54 However, neither of these proposals is
supported by statistics. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case. Costa proved that old-age labor
force participation rates have dropped along with retirement ages in industrialized countries that have
experienced increases in life expectancy.55 According to the National Academy on an Aging Society,
retirement ages have dropped among men in the United States from over 70 in 1900 to around age
63 today.56 Perhaps, as Lee and Goldstein suggest, a rising real income rate over this stretch may have
increased the demand for leisure, thus driving down the retirement age. The increase in life expectancy is
only one of many economic and social trends that have taken place over the past century, and it is vital
to recognize that data reflects the cumulative impact of all these trends.
Clearly, proportionality has inherent flaws as a theory of increasing lifespan. Nevertheless, it is
a widely used metric in economic models examining longevity. In the words of Lee and Goldstein,
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“proportional rescaling provides a starting point, a simple framework, from which to view the largely
unexplored consequences of increasing longevity for the timing of different segments of life. We do
not suggest that all the changes we considered are directly or indirectly caused by increased longevity. In
some cases there are plausible links, but in many cases the causes of change are not in any obvious way
connected to mortality change.”57
Three economists, Bloom, Canning, and Graham, show that an increase in life expectancy prompts
the rational individual to increase savings at every stage of life. Operating under the assumptions that
leisure and consumption are normal goods, they conclude that a rise in life expectancy increases the
optimal length of one’s working years. However, this increase is not enough to provide for consumption
during retirement. Therefore, savings rates should increase at every stage of life.
However, while savings rates increase with increasing longevity, the effect on aggregate savings
is more ambiguous. In a population with a stationary age structure, the savings of the young offsets
the negative savings of the old. However, as Li, Li, and Zhang point out in their 2007 study, as the
population ages, dissavers outnumber savers and aggregate savings is reduced. The old-age dependency
ratio is a demographic metric that measures the number of old people in a population as a percent of
the total working population. This factor needs to be considered when thinking about the influence that
longevity has on savings.
There are two opposite effects taking place. One effect is that people save more at every age as
they expect to live longer. A second is that as people live longer, older people increase in proportion to
younger people, thus reducing aggregate savings. If these two forces cancel out, the net effect would be
zero. Therefore, according to Li, Li, and Zhang, the prospect of increased longevity has a positive effect
on aggregate savings due to increased savings at every age, but an increase in old-age dependency has a
negative effect on aggregate savings as the number of dissavers increase relative to savers. Therefore, the
effect of increased longevity on aggregate savings is ambiguous, depending on which factor is bigger.
D.E. Bloom et al. also points to several of the ways that increased longevity can affect savings. First,
the individual must take into account old age morbidity and factor in the probability that their working
life may be shortened. Secondly, effects of compounding interest and increasing wages produce extra
incentive for savings. Thirdly, imperfect annuity markets may understate the actual value of savings.
Fourthly, social security systems and other such government annuities discourage longer working lives.
Their thesis is that the effect of life expectancy on national savings rates depends on the features of
the social security system of that particular country. With no social security system in place, the optimal
response to life expectancy improvement is the proportional lengthening of working life and no change
in savings rates. However, in countries that have social security systems in place that create incentives
to retire at a particular age, individuals treat retirement age as fixed and save more in order to fund a
longer retirement.58
The Li, Zhang, and Zhang study mentioned earlier attempts to reconcile savings, growth in
longevity, and population age structures. It uses data from the World Bank from over 200 countries from
1960 to 2004. The study regresses (aggregate savings / output) against life expectancy, old to working
age population ratio, and fertility. The authors expect the coefficients for the variables to be positive,
negative, and negative respectively based on the predictions of their theoretical model. After including
an additional variable of log GDP per capita growth into the equation, they find statistical significance in
all the variables to at least the 10% level. Life expectancy had a beta of .002, and the old-age dependency
ratio had a beta of -.603.59
These results follow logically from the prediction that longevity has a positive impact on aggregate
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savings, while old-age dependency has a negative impact. The meaning of the .002 coefficient is that a
one-year increase in life expectancy produces a two-tenths of a percent increase in the aggregate savings
rate. Likewise, a one percent increase in the old-age dependency ratio leads to a six-tenths percentage
point decline in aggregate savings. This study further analyzes the results by doing a rudimentary analysis
of the World Bank Data Set. They look at a set of countries with life expectancies below 50 years over
the period 1993-1998, and another set of countries with life expectancies above 70 years over the same
time frame. The mean life expectancy in the latter group was 74.7 years, and those countries had an
average aggregate savings rate of 21.2%. In the low life expectancy group, the average life expectancy
was 44.9 years with an average aggregate savings rate of 5.8%. Furthermore, the low life expectancy
group had an old-age dependency ratio of 5.5% versus 15.4% in the higher group. The differences
in life expectancy of 30 years account for a 6 percentage point difference in aggregate savings rates
(.002*30), while the difference of 10 percent in old-age dependency ratios account for a 6 percentage
point difference. In this example, these effects balance out.60
Case Study: Longevity and Savings in the United States
The United States is an interesting arena to examine the trend of increasing life expectancy and
its economic impact. Life expectancy of Americans has increased at a rapid rate over the past century,
much like other countries in the developing world. Furthermore, the old-age dependency ratio has
increased, as the older segments of the population have expanded disproportionately. However, this
longevity trend has coexisted with patterns in savings rates and retirement ages that are counterintuitive
to the LZZ model. Retirement ages have, in fact, witnessed a fall over the past century in the United
States. Furthermore, savings rates have turned negative in recent years. Are Americans underestimating
their life expectancies when making decisions regarding consumption and savings?
A rudimentary examination of demographic data in the U.S. from the past fifty years reveals some
interesting trends. Life expectancy has risen from 68.2 years in 1950 to 76.9 in 2000, an increase of
nearly 13%.61 Going back to 1900, life expectancy increased from 47.3 years, representing a precipitous
65% increase to 2000. Likewise, the percentage of the population 65 and over has experienced a ten-fold
increase over the past century. At the time of the last census in 2000, the population aged 65 and over
stood at 35 million, constituting 12.4% of the United States Population. This is a rise from 12.3 million
in 1950. The old-age dependency ratio was 17.4% in 2000, up from 14% in 1950.62
According to the LZZ regressions, the rise in life expectancy from 1950 to 2000 should produce
an increase in aggregate savings rates of .002*8.7, or nearly 1.7%. On the other hand, the increase in
old-age dependency of 3 percentage points over this same stretch of time should result in -.603*3, or
approximately a negative 1.8%. In other words, based on trends in life expectancy and old age dependency
ratios in the United States, one would expect that these effects would cancel out and aggregate savings
per capita would stay constant.
However, the contrary has occurred. Savings in the United States has shown a downward trend since
1950, even dipping into negative figures in recent years. In the 1980s, aggregate savings averaged nine
percent; in the 1990s, they averaged five and a half percent; and from 2000 to 2005, the after-tax savings
rate has averaged a measly one point nine percent.63 The ratio of personal consumption expenditures
to GDP has reached an all-time high of nearly 70%. To accompany this low rate of savings, U.S.
households are carrying a large amount of debt. Recently, the household debt to personal disposable
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income ratio reached an all-time high of 118%.64 Furthermore, the average retirement age across the
country has declined from just over 68 in 1950 to around 63 today for both genders.65
How can people live longer, retire earlier, and save less? Is this behavior rational and, if not, why
are Americans making irrational economic decisions? A large contingency of economists agree upon
the fact that this behavior is irrational. Kevin J. Lansing, Senior Economist at the Federal Bank of San
Francisco, states that “The decline in the U.S. personal saving rate and the dearth of internal saving
raise concerns for the future. In coming decades, a growing fraction of U.S. workers will pass their peak
earning years and approach retirement. In preparation, aging workers should be building their nest eggs
and paying down debt. Instead, many of today’s workers are saving almost nothing and taking on large
amounts of adjustable-rate debt with payments programmed to rise with the level of interest rates.
Failure to boost saving in the years ahead may lead to some painful adjustments in the future when many
of today’s workers could face difficulties maintaining their desired lifestyle in retirement.”66
One rationale for earlier retirement ages and lower savings is that individuals seek to obtain their
Social Security benefits earlier. Retirement income has often been considered a three-legged stool:
personal savings, employee benefits, and social security.67 However, the apparent trend is increasing
reliance on the latter two sources. According to the Social Security Administration, social security and
employee benefits account for 53.6% of retirement income for those aged sixty-five and over. In fact,
one-third of the country has no income personal savings—essentially rendering this leg of the stool
futile.68 As labor force participation rates have taken a drastic dip over the course of the century, retirees
have increasingly relied on social security to fund their later years of life. This behavior is not rational.
Seniors are carrying huge burdens of debt and going into bankruptcy faster than ever. A recent CBS
article stated that credit card debt among seniors age 65 and over has increased 89 percent to $4,041
between 1992 and 2001.69
Another plausible explanation for this irrational savings behavior is increased health care costs. In
other words, decreased mortality does not necessarily mean decreased morbidity. Health care costs have
skyrocketed for seniors in recent years. Hospital bills are becoming hard to swallow. Nursing homes
are charging record enrollment fees. Anticipating these costs is incredibly hard from an economic
perspective, and people generally tend to err on the short side.
Economic theory can only go so far to explain the way people behave. Perhaps it is people’s own
faulty estimations of their personal longevity that is the root of the problem. In the life cycle model,
the rational economic agent estimates their expected lifespan so that savings at the end of life is zero.
In theory, this model sounds fine; however, in practice, the probability of ending up with exactly zero
dollars at your time of death is negligible. It is reasonable to believe that if people act according to the
life cycle hypothesis, then half of the population overestimates their longevity and half underestimates
it. If half of the population plans to die earlier than they actually do, one can only imagine the economic
hardship this would cause.
Richard Pollock and Jack Suyderhoud of the University of Hawaii conducted a study in 1992
which tested subjects’ ability to make rational expectations regarding their own lifespan. The question
they asked was simple: do subject’s perceived life spans take into account further improvements in life
expectancy over the course of their lifetime or are they aligned with current life expectancy tables?
In other words, if a twenty year-old subject expects to live until eighty-two because the current life
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expectancy tables indicate that the life expectancy for a twenty year-old is sixty-two years, then that is an
irrational judgment. It fails to take into account further improvements in life expectancy that will occur
over a subject’s lifespan.70
They polled a large sample of Hawaiians at a variety of ages and asked them how long they expected
to live. The study found that Hawaiians of both genders and of all ages underestimated their lifespan
based on conservative forward extrapolations of U.S. life expectancy. More surprisingly, in every
single age and gender cohort except for one, life expectancy expectations were below the current life
expectancy tables. The cohort of 131 Hawaiian females between the ages of 35-39 expected their life
spans to be over seven years shorter than current life expectancies, and ten and half years shorter
than the conservative extrapolation estimate. In short, subjects grossly underestimated their survival
prospects at highly significant levels.71
This study sheds a very peculiar light on the situation in the United States. If people believe that
their current life span lies below current life expectancy tables, let alone taking into account further
improvements in mortality, this poses a dramatic problem for the economy. In a prior study conducted
by Economist Daniel Hamermesh, it was discovered that people judge their future life spans at least
partially on those of their relatives.72 If people expect to live as long as their parents or grandparents, they
are making irrational judgments that can have serious repercussions. From an evolutionary standpoint, it
seems rational to err on the side of overestimating lifespan. That way, if one dies earlier than expected,
their extra resources can be bequeathed to their offspring, thus helping their survival. Underestimation
results in a reliance upon one’s offspring—draining their resources and detracting from their survival
prospects. Also, given the fact that the standard deviation of life expectancy has increased as well as the
mean, additional incentive is provided for erring on the longer side because the risk of underestimation
is greater.
Even if the most conservative longevity estimates of the realist camp transpire and humans live
until eighty-five years of age, this will still result in an increase in life expectancy well beyond today’s
levels. In order to anticipate this, and perhaps greater increases, it is imperative that people are aware of
the current increases in longevity taking place. As savings rates and retirement ages continue to drop,
more and more elderly members of our population are going into serious debt towards the end of their
lifetime. Perhaps it is time for the Social Security Administration to raise the retirement eligibility age
in a way that reflects the increase in life expectancy. When Social Security commenced in the 1930’s,
life expectancy in the United States was around sixty years of age and twelve years at sixty years old.73
Furthermore, the system still did not pay out benefits until age sixty-five. As a result, the majority of
Americans never received a Social Security check and the system was self-sufficient. Now the situation
is drastically different with the vast majority of the population living past sixty-five.
Until the government acknowledges the phenomenon of increasing longevity and gives it proper
emphasis in public policy, the longevity miracle of the past century will turn into the longevity problem.
People make retirement decisions based off ages set by the Social Security Administration, and it is
therefore up to the government to guide people’s judgments. In this case, good politics are needed to
guide economics. As in many societal problems encompassing the economic and political spheres, it is to
the benefit of government and its people to err on the side of caution. The existence of global warming,
for instance, is still disputed by many. If society doesn’t take any action to remedy the environmental
problem, it may be alright and it may not be. On the other hand, if society is proactive about the issue,
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we either become more efficient as a society or we avoid a complete collapse. In other words, acting on
global warming is a win-win situation, whereas standing idle puts us at the mercy of our circumstance.
The longevity phenomenon is no different. Government can choose to act on this issue and raise
awareness about longevity; or, on the contrary, it can sit idle and risk entering a national economic
crisis.
Humans have been blessed with unfathomable increases in longevity over the past couple centuries
and will likely experience further improvements into the future. It is the responsibility of both our
government and the citizens of our world to study the aging phenomenon and raise awareness worldwide.
This way, long life will be a blessing rather than a curse.
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